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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Trade Regulation-Stock Acquisition by Corporations-Application
of Section Seven of the Clayton Act
Paragraph one of section seven of the Clayton Act,' before the 1950
amendment, provided:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly
or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where
the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen compe-
tition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and
the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such com-
merce in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly
of any line of commerce.
In the recent case of United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and
Co.,2 the United States Supreme Court, in a four to two decision, gave
the above section a broader interpretation than had previously been
given it. First, the Court held that the section applied to a vertical
acquisition, in this case the acquired company being a buyer of the
acquiring company's products; and, secondly, that the effect of the ac-
quisition upon commerce was to be determined at the time the suit was
instituted, rather than at the time the stock acquisition took place.
Although the 1950 amendment to section seven clearly proscribes
vertical acquisitions,8 the Court's holding in the du Pont case that the
section before amendment covered vertical acquisitions is not rendered
moot, because paragraph five of the amended section exempts trans-
actions which transpired prior to passage of the amendment. Because
the effect of the acquisition is to be determined as of the time suit is
brought, the interpretation of section seven as it was written prior to
the amendment remains a live issue since an acquisition which was made
between 1914 and 1950 may become illegal at some future time due to
changing circumstances.
In the du Pont case, the government alleged as violating section seven
of the Clayton Act purchases by the du Pont Company between 1918
and 1920 of more than twenty-three per cent of the outstanding st*ock
of General Motors, a total investment of approximately $49,000,000. 4
138 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 18 (1946).
2353 U. S. 586 (1957).
164 STAT. 1125 (1950), 15 U. S. C. § 18 (1952), amending 38 STAT. 731
(1914), is in part as follows: "No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire
. . . the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital . . . of another
corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition, or tend to create a monopoly." (Emphasis added.)
'The government alleged violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 26
STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1, 2 (1952), as amended, in addition to the
alleged violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act.
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The government conceded that the acquisition of General Motors stock
by du Pont did not substantially lessen competition between the two
companies and the amended complaint alleged only that the effect of du
Pont's acquisition was ". . to tend to create a monopoly in particular
lines of commerce."5' The Court reasoned that, since section seven was
written in the disjunctive, it embraced three separate and distinct effects
of a stock acquisition, citing Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC,6 Ronald
Fabrics Co. v. Verney Brunswick Mills, Inc.,7 and United States v. New
England Fish Exchange.8 In citing the Aluminum case, the Court relied
on dictum because the court of appeals held that there was competition
between the Aluminum Company of America and Rolling Mills Com-
pany, whose stock the Aluminum Company had acquired.9  The Fish
Exchange case is not directly in point because it was decided under
paragraph two of section seven which applies to acquisitions by a com-
pany of the stock of two or more competitors,' 0 although the wording
of the two paragraphs is, for this purpose, identical. The Ronald
Fabrics case is the only case which has been found to apply paragraph
one of section seven to stock acquisitions where the acquiring and ac-
quired companies were not in competition with each other. The Ronald
Fabrics case was a private suit for treble damages by processor A
against processor B which had bought supplier C and, by so doing, cut
off A from his only source of supply.
During the thirty-five year period from the passage of the Clayton
Act in 1914 until the commencement of the du Pont case in 1949, the
Federal Trade Commission and the Justice Department, the agencies
charged with enforcement of the act, had failed to bring a single case
under section seven where there was no competition between the
acquiring and acquired companies."' The failure of an administrative
agency to invoke a purported power is a powerful indication that the
power does not exist.' 2 To lend force to the inference raised by the
failure to so apply the statute for thirty-five years are statements by the
FTC that interpret section seven as applicable to horizontal stock acquisi-
353 U.S. at 591. '284 Fed. 401 (3d Cir. 1922).
11946 Trade Cas. 157514, at 58374 (S. D. N. Y.).8258 Fed. 732 (D. Mass. 1919).
' 284 Fed. at 407. " 258 Fed. at 746.
"
1Both the opinion of the Court (353 U.S. at 590) and the dissent (id. at 610)
point this out.
1 See FTC v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U. S. 349, 351-52 (1941), where it was
said, "That for a quarter century the Commission has made no such claim is a
powerful indication that effective enforcement of the Trade Commission Act is
not dependent on control over intrastate transactions. Authority actually granted
by Congress of course cannot evaporate through lack of administrative exercise.
But just as established practice may shed light on the extent of power conveyed
by general statutory language, so want of assertion of power by those who pre-
sumably would be alert to exercise it, is equally significant in determining whether
stch power was actually conferred." (Emphasis added.)
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tions only.' 3 Although no case has been uncovered which directly
holds that section seven does not apply to vertical acquisitions of stock,
in International Shoe Co. v. FTC,"4 it was held that section seven had
not been violated because there was no substantial competition between
the acquiring and acquired companies. In that opinion the Court said,
"Obviously such acquisition will not produce the forbidden result if
there is no pre-existing substantial competition to be affected."' 5 In
another case,16 the complaint was dismissed upon a finding that no
substantial competition existed either between the acquiring company
and any of the acquired companies, or among the acquired companies.
These cases appear significant in that they require, for a violation of
section seven, competition between the acquired and the acquiring
companies, something that does not exist between companies involved
in a vertical acquisition.
As to the second point of the Court's decision, viz., that the effect of
the acquisition is to be determined as of the time suit is brought, it is
noted that no authority was cited for that proposition. Prior to the
du Pont case only one suit was brought invoking section seven where
the acquisition had occurred more, than three or four years before com-
mencement of the suit.1 7 In that case, a series of transactions was in-
volved stretching from 1917 almost to the time the suit was begun, in
1948. Furthermore the suit was brought under the second paragraph
of section seven of the Clayton Act, which applies to holding companies
and makes illegal the acquisition of stock of two or more corporations
"... where the effect of such acquistion, or the use of such stock ...
may be to substantially lessen competition between such corporations, or
any of them ... or to restrain such commerce in any section or com-
munity, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce."1 8 (Em-
phasis added.) The words, "or the use of such stock," seem to cover
adequately a situation where the effect of the transaction upon commerce
arises some time after the acquisition. The absence in paragraph one
of section seven of the words, "or the use of such stock," might indicate
that Congress did not intend that the effect of a stock acquisition pro-
hibited thereby should be determined as of the time of suit.10 To give
"FTC, REORT oN' CORPORArE MERGES AND AcQuisnioNs 168 (1955).14280 U. S. 291 (1930).
"Id. at 298. From the point of view of the da Pont holding, this is dictum,
since in Interzational Shoe, the allegation that the acquisition tended to create
a monoploy was not pressed on appeal, thus giving the Court no occasion to decide
whether such an effect as alleged required competition between the acquired and
acquiring corporations to come within the statute.
1" In the Matter of Austin, Nichols & Co., 9 F. T. C. 170 (1925).
17353 U. S. at 610-11 (dissenting opinion). The lone case was Transamerica
Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F. 2d 163 (3d Cir. 1953).1838 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 18 (1946).
2353 U. S. at 620-21 (dissenting opinion).
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to section seven the interpretation given to it by the Court in the
du Pont case is to subject all companies acquiring stock in good faith
to the hazard of having a legal transaction become illegal because of
unforseeable developments, 20 an effect which Congress may be doubted
to have intended.
ROGER A. HOOD
Trade Regulation-Unfair Competition-Dilution of Trade Marks
In Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Mfg. Co.,' Esquire magazine
sought to enjoin the defendant, a manufacturer of men's slippers, from
using the word "Esquire" written in any manner whatsoever on its
product, in its corporate name, or in its advertising. The plaintiff, in
the words of the court, "seems almost to contend that the word 'Esquire,'
except, usually abbreviated, as a form of address or title, as customarily
used in addressing members of the bar, has as a practical matter dis-
appeared from the English language except as the name of its maga-
zine.' 2 According to the opinion of the lower court in this case,3 5,000
persons in this country have adopted the word "Esquire" commercially,
including barber shops, service stations, and cafes. Even before the
plaintiff's trade-mark was registered, the name was registered for men's
furnishings, pipes, toilet articles, watches, and writing paper. In the
last few years, Esquire, Inc., has gone on an extended campaign to
acquire exclusive rights for its mark. This campaign includes "friendly"
letters, warnings of suit, and occasionally litigation. Apparently over
1,000 users of the word in unrelated fields have given up the mark under
plaintiff's threats. The plaintiff has gone so 'far as to claim that it is
protected against derivative words and that, therefore, "Squire's Home
for Aged and Convalescent," "Squire Market," and "Squire Realty
Co." are (or were) infringing on plaintiff's rights.4
Thus the question is squarely presented as to just how much pro-
tection the owner of a nationally advertised and nationally known mark
is entitled to receive from users in unrelated or at best distantly related
fields.
The plaintiff's hope for protection lies in an action for unfair compe-
tition of which trade-mark infringement is but a part.5 Unfair compe-
tition is an expanding concept and in arriving at its present status has
2 Neal, The Clayton Act and the Transamerica Case, 5 STA'. L. RZv. 179,
220-21 (1953).
'243 F. 2d 540 (1st Cir. 1957).
2Id. at 543.
'Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Mfg. Co., 139 F. Supp. 228 (D. Mass. 1956).
'Id. at 231.
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403 (1916).
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